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14.1 Introduction  
Our approach to Technology Users’ Innovation (TUI) builds on studies that analyse 
inventors/innovators within socio-technical networks (Grabher, Ibert, & Flohr, 2008; Ohly, 
Kase, & Skerlavaj, 2010; von Hippel, 1988). We argue that inventors selectively participate 
in the socio-technical networks relevant to their particular efforts at innovation. We further 
argue that such selective involvement in financial capital, government support, IP and so on 
can be measured, with membership scored according to criteria emerging from both theory 
and the substantive knowledge and understanding accumulated from our case studies. 
Examining the networks in which these innovative technology users operate, and how these 
networks influence the processes by which an inventor succeeds or fails, can provide much 
needed empirical evidence about innovation success and failure at a time when greater 
understanding of innovation is vital to economic development. 
 
Among the things that may indirectly influence innovation, we identify social capital as a 
vital piece of the innovation puzzle, certainly present in our TUI case studies but extending 
throughout the wider networks of government and private organisations (see also Firkin, 
2001; Landry, Amara, & Lamari, 2002; Rutten & Boekema, 2007). There are three 
components of social capital that have been described (Putnam, 2000; Svendsen & 
Sorensen, 2007) and that we have recognised in our TUI case studies. They are bonding 
capital, an ‘inward-looking’ trust and support that takes place within boundaries of 
exclusivity, such as family ties or ethnic communalism; bridging capital, the ‘outward-
looking’ networks that enable individuals and groups to exchange tangible and intangible 
assets with outsiders; and organisational capital, the structures and practices that simple 
enable ‘things to be done’. 
 
We also use a new approach to describing and understanding innovation. Fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) examines cases according to their memberships of 
sets defined by the researcher to identify the pathways by which a particular outcome, in 
this current research the success or failure of technology users’ innovation, takes place. 
Data collected through interviews with inventors and other key participants in innovation, 
complemented by internet and database searches, enables individual innovators to be 
scored according to their capital, government support, manufacturing engagement, 
intellectual property rights (IP) and other business activities. In particular, we use this 
approach to better discriminate between the two poles of success and failure by calibrating 




FsQCA and its parent QCA were developed by Charles Ragin and others (Ragin, 2000; Ragin 
& Sonnett, 2004; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) to aid the investigation of causal complexity across 
multiple cases, especially studies involving a small or intermediate number of cases. These 
approaches allow the combination of qualitative and quantitative data and the assessment 
of a cases membership in all possible logical combinations of causal factors described by the 
presence, absence or (in fsQCA) partial membership of selected causal conditions. Results 
are presented as Boolean equations, allowing minimization to key commonalities leading to 
nominated outcomes. The extension of QCA to incorporate the concept of fuzzy sets allows 
for the degree of membership to vary, capturing two aspects of diversity we readily observe 
in the field: differences of kind and differences of degree.  
 
QCA approaches accept that causation will be configurational (i.e., more than one factor will 
be involved) and, as a consequence, more than one pathway to the outcome may exist. 
Variables are refined through successive analyses as results are referred back to cases to 
both utilise and challenge theory as empirical evidence is refined and ever greater 
familiarity with case studies is developed. Researchers must first specify the relevant study 
domain, beginning with the set of cases selected for investigation.  
 
Researchers then designate degrees of fuzziness relevant to the concepts being researched. 
Fuzzy-set scores do not reflect a simple ranking of cases relative to each other. A number of 
frameworks for the transformation of ‘crisp’ variables (where a variable is either present or 
absent) to fuzzy variables are offered in Ragin (2000). We utilise several types, including the 
dichotomous crisp set. Empirical evidence must be identified to allow the appropriate 
calibration of membership scores. Finally, this empirical evidence is translated into fuzzy 
scores. While software has simplified both QCA and fsQCA, the steps outlined above show 
that putting fsQCA in practice involves considerable effort on the part of the researcher.1 
The methodology and results are presented in detail in Lambert and Fairweather (2010). 
 
Previous studies utilize the possibilities of fuzzy-set QCA to better model the real-world 
experiences of innovators as they selectively participate in networks of innovation. These 
networks are a complex mix of socio-technical institutions that include markets, regulatory 
regimes, private firms, sectoral interests, and individual actions. Through familiarizing 
ourselves with both the theoretical understanding of innovation and empirical data from 
our case studies, we identified and framed five factors considered potentially causal in 
innovation success. In addition, we also refined the characterization of the outcomes of 
success or failure and also refined an understanding of success or failure as outcomes.  
 
                                                     
1
 Free software for QCA and fsQCA approaches is available from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml. 
The Comparative methods for the Advancements of Systematic cross-case analysis and Small-n Studies website 
http://www.compasss.org/pages/welcome.html provides useful working papers and an extensive bibliographical 
database. 
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14.3 Identification and Selection of Case Studies and Variables 
Data were drawn from extended interviews with over 55 inventors and innovators, leading 
to 43 final case studies set against a broader analysis of New Zealand’s innovation policies 
and practice. Their experiences were analysed for participation in innovation networks 
using fsQCA, supplemented by interviews with key participants, information held in 
databases, and media and sectoral reports. In the course of reviewing the literature, 
consulting with colleagues, case study participants, end-users, and through preliminary 
fieldwork, we identified five dimensions of socio-technical networks in which innovators 
actively sought participation to enable their innovations: 
 
 Funding (particularly private funding including that sourced from family); 
 Government support (primarily, but not exclusively, funding); 
 Intellectual property protection (comprising patents, trademarks, design, and 
copyright); 
 Manufacturing of the innovation; 
 Other business activities. 
14.3.1 Financial capital (Capital) 
The power of money to transform an idea into a prototype and an invention into an 
innovation is not disputed; as one interviewee said ‘Really, the only thing you need to 
innovate is money!’ What was more pertinent for our study was the calibrating of financial 
capital so that we could account for varying membership in the set of financed innovations. 
In our case studies the level of financial capital ranged from several hundred dollars to $1.6 
million. Many self-financed through family firms and farms, emphasizing the role of bonding 
social capital (Putnam, 2000).  
14.3.2 Government Support (Govt) 
The drive for innovation is a fundamental feature of contemporary political economics and 
some forms of state support for innovation appears universal. Government financial 
support for our case studies ranged from $5,000 to several hundred thousand dollars. 
Support was also secured through government programmes of business mentors, 
innovation incubators, as well tertiary students and government employees, sometimes on 
an informal basis. 
 
Several cases gained invaluable support from employees of government organisations and 
universities on an informal basis. This was described in terms similar to participation in a 
‘community of practice’ (see Fox, 2000; Wenger, 1998) in which individuals were personally 
committed to, for example, a more sustainable future and gave their time and skills to 
projects that satisfied these beliefs. There were disparate types of government support 
mentioned by our cases: financial, pastoral, professional advice and/or training, or 




14.3.3 Intellectual Property (IP) 
IP was a controversial topic for many inventors. The more experienced inventors were often 
strongly proactive in IP negotiations. While some cases were upset by negative experiences, 
primarily through bad advice, several cases undertook much of the work with what they 
thought was relative ease. Others ignored IP and one interviewee adhered to Creative 
Commons principles in making freely available material he published. In some cases IP 
seemed to be an ancillary feature, attached to an innovation through advice and an 
acceptance that protecting IP was a part of being a serious innovator. In the energy sector 
most TUIs were engineers trained and experienced in a sector where securing and clarifying 
IP was standard practice. Those cases that dismissed or disparaged IP did not do so through 
any ignorance of its function; several owned profitable IP on earlier innovations. For some it 
was not prioritized when ‘speed to market’ was considered the key to success, and IP is, of 
course, no guarantee of exclusivity.  
14.3.4 Manufacturing 
The image of the single-minded, even eccentric, inventor toiling in a workshop resonates 
with many people in New Zealand, especially in the rural sector. Most case studies built 
their own prototypes and many built a considerable component of the final technological 
artifact. The inventor often retained a role in manufacturing but contracted out other 
aspects due to realities of expertise, scale or productivity. While there are cases of TUI 
success where most of the manufacturing was ‘in-house’ this was generally within a small 
firm owned by the innovator who thus has time and energy for other important innovation 
tasks.  
 
Several innovations were manufactured in China, with the inventors themselves forging and 
maintain these cross-border/cross-cultural relationships. One case arranged the necessary 
introductions and visits via the internet. Regular trips to China were taken by several TUI 
cases to discuss manufacturing issues. Quality was generally very good, an issue of special 
importance to TUI people given their strong trade backgrounds and appreciation of 
technical excellence.  
14.3.5 Business Activities 
Broader commercial networks were apparent at an early stage of our research, with several 
successful innovators having established other and prior businesses. For some innovators, 
other businesses provided an important income stream that could be used to finance 
experimental work. These activities expanded networks of potential support and useful 
information, not only within their specialized sector but across other sectors and into 
national and international regulatory contexts. Others expressed regret at not having 
developed business skills, seeing that as a significant restraint on their innovation efforts. 
 
One fundamental feature of supportive business networks spoken of in interviews was the 
awareness and sensitivity to unethical practices. Most cases had experienced what they 
perceived as incompetency or corruption. Many others volunteered instances of dishonesty 
in their sector, and while it was not possible to prove or disprove these claims, we are 
confident that societal trust and ethical business practices will facilitate the growth of the 
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social capital that underpins TUIs. Overall, 29 of our case studies were engaged in more 
than one business activity, comprising two thirds of all cases studies. 
14.3.6 The Outcome: Innovation Success or Failure 
Our case studies reflected a nuanced interpretation of their success or failure. All noted 
their inventions ‘worked’ by solving the problem that prompted the attempt. Yet when 
confronted with the difficulties of commercializing their invention, some conceded they 
were not very, or not yet, successful. For our study we have ascribed success according to 
the degrees of spatial, temporal and hierarchical diffusion achieved by a case study, drawing 
on insights from diffusion studies.1 Any innovation that was successfully exported was given 
full membership. This is in part justified on the grounds that New Zealand government 
innovation policy is primarily directed to achieving export success but also from the 
evidence of case studies actively seeking export success as a goal. Extensive national sales 
and distribution was scored 0.8; regional and/or limited national sales, 0.6. Innovations that 
had some limited national success but are no longer sold or manufactured were scored 0.4; 
those that only achieved limited local sales were scored 0.2. Innovations with no sales were 
clear ‘non-members’ and scored 0.  
 
We define success of an innovation according to the characteristics of its diffusion. It was 
not possible to judge an innovation on its technical ‘competency’, that is, how good a 
widget or process was compared to competitors. Not all inventors were motivated to 
succeed commercially; their role in our study is nevertheless very useful in understanding 
innovation by technology users. 
 
14.4 Results 
In the presentation of results that follow, configurations are written as a Boolean equation 
with membership or presence indicated by upper-case letters for the relevant network (e.g., 
‘MANU’ means the innovator undertakes a majority of the manufacturing); lower-case 
means the innovator is more out than in that particular network, (e.g., ‘ip’ means the 
innovator lacks IP protection). 
14.4.1 Pathways to success 
We now present results derived from the software, making use of QCA Boolean logic which 
allows terms to be automatically minimized by excluding so-called redundant factors, i.e., 
those logical configurations that do not have empirical examples in our research (Lambert & 
Fairweather, 2010). In this way we draw attention to the key configurations common to 
success (S) and failure (F).  
 
 CAPITAL*manu*IP  
 CAPITAL*BIZ*IP     →  S 
 
                                                     
1
 The diffusion of innovations has occupied a central position in a number of disciplines at various stages of their 
development, notably rural sociology, geography and medical sociology in the 1950s and 60s, and marketing in the 1980s 
and 90s (see Rogers, 2005).  
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In plain language, success has two significant pathways: well financed, not undertaking 
significant manufacturing, and holding relevant IP; or well financed, engaged in other 
businesses, again with relevant IP.  
14.4.2 Pathways to failure 
Failure is primarily through lack of participation in all but manufacturing. It should be noted 
that this configuration describes the archetypal Kiwi ‘back shed’ inventor: good at making, 
and then ‘tinkering’ with an invention, but giving disproportionate attention to this part of 
the process at the expense of other necessary aspects.  
 
 capital* govt*biz*ip*MANU  →  F 
 
However, two other significant pathways to failure exist: 
 
 CAPITAL*govt*BIZ*MANU*ip 
 capital*GOVT*BIZ*MANU*ip     → F 
 
These results are still important as they show that failure is not solely a case of the inventor 
isolating themselves in their workshop. Innovators who are participating strongly in some of 
the key networks, such as financial capital, government support, and other businesses, can 
still fail.  
 
14.5 Discussion: Social capital operating within socio-technical networks  
In interviews, our case studies spoke of important support originating with family farms and 
firms. This support included significant financial capital as well as moral support and 
ancillary skills such as administration, promotion and marketing. Venture capital and angel 
investors were not common among our case studies; the small-scale and often possessive 
and self-directed nature of the TUI cases we examine are not characteristics that appeal to 
venture capitalists (see Hellman & Puri, 2002). 
 
We found that many TUI cases arranged acceptable manufacturing in China and were happy 
with the technical quality and business relationships. While we did find examples of 
technically simple TUI products, such as molded plastics, being manufactured with ease by 
small specialist firms, for several of our cases, relying on Chinese manufacturing enabled 
costs to be kept significantly lower, contributing to their ultimate success. Pathways to 
innovation success in the farming sector include the presence of business activities. Instead 
of the classic image of a farming couple squirreling away in the backblocks of rural New 
Zealand, what we see in successful cases is a well-connected partnership accessing 
information, support, and capital, often through other business ventures. 
 
Our results show that successful TUI innovation requires that inventors manage effectively 
the wide range of factors surrounding them and their technology. While this may seem a 
truism, innovators give variable attention to these network connections, while conceding 
their family and peers have vital roles: small-scale innovation is supported by social capital. 
Thus while TUI innovation is often constrained by its micro-scale, it is enabled by its 
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networks of family, collegiality, and trust, often with fellow technological travellers and 
especially where an innovation advances sustainability. Such social capital plays an 
important role in mediating the connections between the key factors of innovation, 
whether it is bonding and bridging through the inventors’ family, friends and peers, or wider 
organizational capital in the performances of other participants in New Zealand’s innovation 
system.  
 
14.6 Conclusions  
This paper has presented the results of a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 
technology users’ innovation and found a number of different pathways to their success 
and failure. The most common pathways to success were to be well supported financially, 
with the inventor either engaged in other businesses or not undertaking significant 
manufacturing. Relevant IP protection emerges as a feature of an innovator’s research, 
networking and collaboration, and was seen by some as a mark of their achievement and 
professionalism. The most common feature of the failure of TUI cases was their lack of 
membership in the networks of finance, government, IP and other businesses, yet with 
strong membership in manufacturing, features which describe the iconic image of the ‘Kiwi’ 
back shed/’number 8 wire’ inventor. 
 
Technology users’ who innovate undergo continual struggles to participate effectively in 
relevant networks, even when these networks comprise people, organisations and 
resources dedicated to innovation. Success is the product of both individual inventive ability 
and the ability to manage, including selective participation in, the innovation network 
within which the invention evolves. While the inventor is the key node of this network – and 
could be said to ‘surround’ the invention - successful innovation requires the release of this 
often intensely personal technology to the benefit of others. The broader context of 
supporting TUI networks encompasses social capital, expressed as trust and ethical 
practices that nurture invention such that the negotiations towards its release as an 
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